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ESSAY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN SUFFERING:
AWARENESS, PARTICIPATION, AND THE
FRONTIERS OF TORT LAW
Timothy D. Lyttont
"An injustice remains inextricably bound to all suffering"
- Albert Camusi
Disagreements over responsibility for human suffering fre-
quently stem from disparate understandings of what it means to be
responsible. 2 In such disputes, parties often talk past one another.
They do not simply disagree; rather, they fail to communicate mean-
ingfully. This essay examines two distinct notions of responsibility
and how they shape different ways people think about injustice.
These two understandings of responsibility emerge out of dif-
ferent answers to the question: when are individuals responsible for
the suffering of others? One might answer that individuals are re-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Capital University Law and Graduate Center. B.A.
1987, J.D. 1991, Yale University. I owe special thanks to Peter Berkowitz, Donald
Hughes, Daniel Kobil, Stephen Perry, Anthony Sebok, Rodney Smith, Wendy Wagner,
Ernest Weinrib, and Patrick Wilkinson for their steady support and careful criticisms.
Thanks also to participants in the Ohio Legal Theory Workshop for helpful suggestions.
In addition, I am grateful to David Karr for essential research assistance, Chris
Brandewie for lending his graphic design skills, and Martha Bush for unfailing clerical
support.
I ALBERT CAmus, THE REBEL 304 (Anthony Bows trans., 1956).
2 Such disagreements may also arise out of different perceptions concerning the
facts of a situation. Recent writings in moral and political theory have carefully ex-
amined this problem of competing perspectives and illuminated the dangers of resolving
conflicts by favoring one perspective over others. See generally CATHARINE A. MAcKIN-
NON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (discussing the dominance of
male perspective in the law); THoMAs NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986) (offering
a theory of objectivity as a shared perspective rather than a universal one).
One may question whether locating responsibility for suffering is a matter of finding
it or placing it. On one hand, responsibility may be an implicit feature of human rela-
tions such that those who examine them "discover" it. On the other hand, responsibility
may be an external normative judgment applied to relationships such that those who
evaluate them "impose" it. This difference between uncovering and attributing respon-
sibility is analogous to competing perspectives in literary theory between the belief that
interpretation involves finding meaning in a text and the view that reading is an act of
constructing meaning. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986). I do not wish
presently to take a position on this issue of what the act of locating responsibility really
entails. I believe that this ambiguity will not significantly affect my analysis.
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sponsible only when they are aware that their actions do or could
cause harm to others. According to this view, responsibility for
human suffering attaches only when an actor knowingly puts others
at risk. This response offers a paradigm of responsibility based on a
person's awareness of her potential to do harm.
One might instead answer the question by claiming that individ-
uals are responsible for the suffering of others whenever they par-
ticipate in practices that contribute to it. The causes of injury may
be remote and diffuse. When this is the case, it may be difficult to
identify particular actions that cause specific harms. In such com-
plex situations, individual actors may be unable to anticipate the full
effects of their actions. Yet the complexity of such causal connec-
tions ought to provide no excuse for those who take part in the crea-
tion and maintenance of practices that harm others. This second
approach provides a paradigm of responsibility grounded on
participation.
The difference between these two paradigms underlies many
disagreements about responsibility for contemporary social
problems. Adherence to one of these paradigms will shape one's
approach to claims that whites are responsible for racial oppression
or men for sex inequality or North American consumers for labor
exploitation. The paradigm of awareness restricts responsibility to
those whites, men, or consumers who knowingly promote the re-
spective harms. In contrast, the paradigm of participation extends
responsibility to all those within these groups who participate know-
ingly or otherwise in practices that produce these different forms of
suffering.3
Tension between these two approaches to responsibility ap-
pears not only in political discourse but also within social institu-
tions. Tort law, which expresses and enforces public norms
concerning liability for harm to others, often provides a forum for
the conflict between these two understandings of responsibility. For
example, the recent extension of strict liability to manufacturers for
product-related injury and reactions against this doctrinal develop-
ment shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of each paradigm.
While tort law generally favors the paradigm of awareness, the para-
digm of participation occasionally finds expression in exceptional
doctrines.
3 Throughout this essay I will be discussing responsibility based on individual ac-
tions, some of which occur within the context of groups. However, I will not be dealing
with any theories of responsibility founded on notions of collective action or member-
ship in a group. See DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 167-75 (discussing methods of reasoning
about group responsibility and the personification of community).
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This essay attempts to clarify these distinct understandings of
responsibility and employ them to illuminate current conflicts in
political discourse and tort law. Part I examines in detail the para-
digms of awareness and participation. Part II offers examples of
how the disparity between the paradigms often leads to miscom-
munication in contemporary disagreements about moral responsi-
bility for various forms of human suffering. Part III considers how
this conflict of paradigms manifests itself in tort doctrine.
The underlying method of this essay entails two distinct ele-
ments. First, I will analyze two particular social conflicts about re-
sponsibility that, I believe, illustrate a widespread normative
difference at the heart of many contemporary disagreements in our
society. The conflicts that I examine concern racial and economic
relations. Second, I will interpret a particular doctrinal conflict in
tort law in the light of this normative difference. In doing this, my
aim is to support a particular understanding of tort law.4 I believe
that tort law is an essentially normative enterprise that both reflects
and influences broader moral conflicts in society.5 In the end, I
hope to show how tort law enforces a balance between competing
understandings of responsibility for injustice.
I
Two MODELS OF RESPONSIBILITY: AWARENESS VS.
PARTICIPATION
A complete theory of responsibility would include discussion of
the sources of responsibility (where it comes from),6 an account of
the grounds of responsibility (what it is based on),7 and the conse-
4 A masterful example of this theoretical method is JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND
WRONGS (1992). See also Timothy D. Lytton, Smashing the Idols ofEfficienty, 79 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1992) (reviewingJuLEs COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992)).
5 Several contemporary tort theorists, Richard Epstein, Jules Coleman, and Ernest
Weinrib foremost among them, have argued that tort law enforces various conceptions
of corrective justice for wrongdoing. See COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 361; Richard Epstein,
A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. LEG. STUD. 151 (1973); Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality
of Tort Law, 34 McGiLL LJ. 403 (1989); Ernest Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL.
U. L. REV. 485 (1989).
Epstein, Coleman, and Weinrib all exclude multi-party products liability cases from
their moral accounts of tort law. Epstein accomplishes this by limiting his notion of what
counts as a cause of harm in tort, Coleman by asserting that decisions in such cases
exemplify economic rather than moral reasoning, and Weinrib by refusing to recognize
such cases as tort cases at all. In contrast, I will offer a moral theory of tort law that
accounts for multi-party products liability cases along with more traditional torts.
6 For example, responsibility might derive from some transcendent order, from
political authority, or from personal conscience.
7 For example, responsibility might be based on judgments about the decisions
individuals make, or the positions in family or society that they occupy, or obligations
that attach to them.
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quences of responsibility (what it implies),8 This essay addresses
only the second of these. It is disagreement concerning the grounds
of responsibility that defines the distinction between the paradigms
of awareness and participation.
In order to highlight the feature of each paradigm most rele-
vant to the distinction between awareness and partcipation as the
ground of responsibility, I have reduced them to simple claims.
Consider the following statements of each paradigm:
AWARENESS: A person should be responsible for harm suffered by
another only if the harm results from a course of action chosen by
the person and the person was aware of a potential for the type of
harm that results.
PARTICIPATION: A person should be responsible for harm suffered
by another if the harm results from a practice in which the person
chooses to participate.
For the purposes of this analysis, I will consider only what the para-
digms have to say about personal responsibility. 9 Under both mod-
els, responsibility rests upon features of an individual's action.' 0
Both claims state grounds on which a person should be, as op-
posed to is, responsible. These are normative claims, not analytical
ones. A central purpose of distinguishing between the two para-
digms is to show that nothing in the definition of responsibility itself
requires a person to adopt one paradigm rather than the other. A
preference for awareness over participation, or vice versa, must be
the result of substantive moral argument, not simply an exercise in
definition.
There are three important features of each paradigm that do
not distinguish them. First, both paradigms assume that responsi-
bility for a harm requires that the harm result from human action.II
Specifying what counts as human action-for instance whether this
8 For example, responsibility might provide reasons for action, or define relations
between people, or help constitute personal identity.
9 It would be possible to articulate claims about group action as the basis of re-
sponsibility under each paradigm, but this would only complicate the analysis without
clarifying the contrast between the two paradigms.
10 That is, responsibility under the paradigm of participation is grounded on an
individual's action within the context of a group, not on the individual's membership in
that group. For a discussion of responsibility based upon membership in a group, see
DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 167-75.
11 In defining the paradigm of awareness, I have referred to action using the phrase
"course of action," whereas in defining the paradigm of participation, I have employed
the term "practice." I wish both of these to denote individual action, although I am
aware that the first carries a connotation of isolated action and the second a connotation
of action within the context of a group activity. The reason for this discrepancy is to
make the rhetoric of each claim familiar to those who adhere to it in order to provide a
fair and recognizable presentation of each paradigm.
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category includes nonfeasance as well as misfeasance-is essential
to any full development of the two models, but does not serve to
distinguish them. Clearly, one might develop different substantive
theories of action for each, but one need not, and to do so at this
point would only cloud the distinction between them that I wish to
highlight.
Second, both paradigms require that a person choose to act or
participate. Neither model attributes responsibility in the absence
of an agent's choice to perform an act or participate in a practice
that results in harm to another. While there may be a variety of
substantive theories of what it means to choose an action, many of
them could be applied to both models without affecting the distinc-
tion on which I wish to focus attention.
Third, in both paradigms causation-that harm "result from" a
choice of action or participation-is necessary in order for responsi-
bility to attach. Like action and choice, cause is an essential feature
of responsibility under each model. And like action and choice,
cause does not distinguish between them. 12 Analyzing any one of
these three complex concepts presents an enormously difficult task,
one which could easily overwhelm any discussion of responsibility.
However, since neither action, choice, nor cause distinguish the par-
adigms of awareness and participation, putting aside further exami-
nation of these features seems warranted.' 3
The central distinguishing feature of responsibility under the
paradigm of awareness is awareness of a potentialfor the type of harm that
results. According to this model, determining a person's responsibil-
ity for the suffering of others requires examination of his decision to
act. To incur responsibility, a person's process of deliberation in
choosing to act must include an awareness of the possibility for inju-
rious consequences. Under the paradigm of awareness, one must
choose to harm another, or at least choose to run the risk of doing
so, in order to be responsible for any resulting injury. This condi-
tion of actual knowledge concerning the possibility of harm may be
weakened without great change in the paradigm by requiring only
12 For the purposes of this essay, I will employ the notion of Necessary Element of a
Sufficient Set (NESS) causation defended by Richard Wright. The NESS test holds that
a particular condition is a cause of a specific consequence if it is a necessary element of a
set of sufficient actual antecedent conditions. See generally Richard Wright, Causation in
Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985).
13 Those wishing to pursue these matters may begin by consulting the following
sources. For an examination of action, see Bernard Williams, Voluntary Acts and Responsi-
ble Agents, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1990). For analyses of choice, see DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 21-42 (1986) (discussing rational choice) and JOSEPH
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 148-57 (1986) (discussing coercion). For discussions
of cause, see H.L.A. HART & ToNy HONORI, CAUSATION IN THE LAw (2d ed. 1985) and
Wright, supra note 12.
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that the person should have known, under some normatively rele-
vant standard of knowledge, that harm might result from her chosen
action.1 4 But even accepting this weaker version of the paradigm of
awareness, why should responsibility for harm which one causes re-
quire that one knew or should have known about the possibility of
harmful consequences?
According to the paradigm of awareness, holding a person re-
sponsible for harm that she did not or could not have known about
would be unfair. Proponents of this view explain that the only out-
comes of an individual's action that are properly subject to moral
judgment are those that she considered when choosing to act. 15
Only these outcomes are expressions of her moral agency; only
these are "hers" in a normatively relevant sense. Other outcomes
are mere circumstantial occurrences, no more attributable to her
than the weather or the wind speed.16 Harms of which an actor was
not (or could not have been) aware at the time she chose to act were
not (or could not have been) part of her deliberation, and hence are
not properly attributable to her for the purpose of determining
moral responsibility for them.
Christopher Schroeder has described this focus on deliberation
when determining responsibility as an "ex ante" or "before-the-fact"
14 The difference between actual knowledge and some normatively determined
level of knowledge, such as "reasonable" knowledge, will not significantly affect my
analysis. However, my decision to include both of these formulations within the same
paradigm does represent a conscious choice to present disagreements over responsibil-
ity for human suffering as differences about whether foresight is a necessary condition of
responsibility. A different approach might instead interpret such disagreements as argu-
ments about which harms are reasonably foreseeable, assuming that foresight is a neces-
sary condition of responsibility. This second approach would locate disagreement over
responsibility for human suffering entirely within the paradigm of awareness, whereas
the first explains such disagreement by reference to the distinction between the para-
digms of awareness and participation. Neither approach is necessary, and the superior-
ity of one over the other depends upon which more clearly illuminates the
disagreements. I am grateful to Tony Sebok for pointing out this distinction to me. See
infra note 26.
15 See George P. Fletcher, The Search for Synthesis in Tort Theory, 2 LAW & PHIL. 63, 68,
72 (1983) (discussing excuse from responsibility for harm as based on restriction of the
choice, such as ex ante limits on information, which led to the action that caused the
harm.); Christopher Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA
L. REv. 439, 451-52, 453 nn.58 & 59 (1990) (asserting the unfairness of taking into
account information unavailable to an agent ex ante when judging his actions and citing
the prevalence of such a view among moral theorists).
16 See Fletcher, supra note 15, at 66-69 (discussing "circumstantial" harms that may
result from "voluntary interaction in the public sphere" and are "the product of the
inevitable interaction of human beings living in the same community"). Fletcher consid-
ers circumstantial losses as morally equivalent to natural losses. Cf Tony Honor6, Re-
sponsibility and Luck, 104 LAw Q. REv. 530, 543 (1988) (arguing that all outcomes of
human actions are constitutive of personal identity and thus belong to the person who
causes them).
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approach. Arguing that this approach constitutes the dominant
trend in moral theory, he writes:
The person who, after the fact, judges... [an] actor must respect
the agent's ex ante view. It is unfair to appraise an actor using cri-
teria, information, or theories that were unavailable to her at the
relevant moment, the moment of decision. We must ask whether
the agent chose correctly or permissibly, knowing what the agent
then knew. After-acquired information cannot enter into the anal-
ysis. "After the event even a fool is wise. But it is not the hind-
sight of a fool; it is the foresight of the reasonable man which
alone can determine responsibility."' 7
This approach evaluates the question of responsibility for harm
from the perspective of the choosing agent at a point in time prior
to the occurrence of injury.
The paradigm of awareness reflects concern for the moral au-
tonomy of the choosing agent. It refuses to subject individuals to
moral judgment and the adverse consequences that may accompany
it for harms primarily caused by circumstances or events beyond
their control. To judge people by the manner in which they exercise
their moral agency shows respect for them as moral agents. It en-
courages them to focus on the choices that confront them.'
In contrast, to judge individuals responsible for unfortunate
outcomes of their actions, outcomes of which they were not aware
when they chose to act, disregards their moral capacities. Such a
focus on the unanticipated and perhaps unforeseeable provokes
anxiety and distracts individuals from careful consideration of the
choices that they face. The prospect of responsibility for all harm
that results from an individual's action, including injuries which she
17 Schroeder, supra note 15, at 452 (quoting Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Masts
Dock & Eng'g Co. ("The Wagon Mound (No. 1)") [1961] App. Cas 388, 424 (P.C.)
(Austl.)).
18 In a similar vein, Alan Gewirth has claimed that individuals ought to be responsi-
ble only for those harms that result directly from their choice of action. This encourages
people to make morally correct choices with regard to the immediate consequences of
their actions, despite possibly calamitous indirect results. See Alan Gewirth, Are There Any
Absolute Rights?, in THEORIES OF RIGHrrs 91, 104-05 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (discuss-
ing the doctrine of intervening causes).
One might, as does Gewirth, draw a distinction between direct and indirect, or im-
mediate and mediate consequences of one's actions. These distinctions might serve as
alternatives to the one I have chosen (awareness and participation). One might observe
a contingent coincidence between direct or immediate consequences and those of which
one is (or could have been) aware. Similarly, indirect or mediate consequences might
often coincide with those of which an actor could not have been aware. However, de-
spite this overlap, there are differences between these alternative distinctions. For the
purposes of this essay, I have chosen the distinction between awareness and participa-
tion because I believe that it most clearly illuminates disagreements over responsibility
for human suffering. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 28-33 and ac-
companying text.
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did not (or could not) anticipate, restricts her autonomy insofar as it
limits what she chooses to do for fear of unknown consequences. In
addition, if she incurs a penalty for such consequences, this will re-
duce her ability to choose or her range of choice in the future.
Thus, personal autonomy-the freedom to choose-underlies the
paradigm of awareness.
In contrast, responsibility under the paradigm of participation
requires only that a person's action contribute causally to another's
harm.19 According to this approach, an individual who chooses to
act in a way that contributes to the suffering of another is responsi-
ble for that person's suffering.20 This is so regardless of whether
the actor considered the possibility of harm when determining how
to act. More precisely, while choosing to act entails that a person
have in mind some consequence or purpose of his action, it does not
require that he be aware of any particular consequence. According to
the paradigm of participation, a person should be responsible for
even unanticipated harms. Indeed, the paradigm of participation
goes even further, holding that whether the injurer knew or even
could have known of the possibility for harm resulting from his ac-
tion is wholly irrelevant to determining responsibility. 21 But how
can it be fair to hold someone responsible for harm which he could
not have anticipated?
The answer to this question lies in considering the issue of fair-
ness not only from the injurer's perspective but also from the vic-
tim's as well. According to the paradigm of participation, when an
individual suffers due to the actions of another, it seems only fair to
place responsibility for the harm on the injurer. To place responsi-
bility on the victim compounds the initial injury, for "blaming the
victim" is itself a form of inflicting further harm.
To treat unforeseeable injuries caused by others as a type of
natural misfortune-a result of the complexity of modem life-may
simply be another way of placing responsibility on the victim. Even
though a natural disaster is clearly beyond human control, it is still
the victims who are responsible for taking adequate safety precau-
tions. Furthermore, blaming human suffering on some structural
19 By cause, I mean Wright's notion of NESS causation. See supra note 12.
20 For an action to "belong" to a person, that person must have chosen it. How-
ever, choosing an action is not the same as considering all of the possible consequences
that might result from it.
21 The notion that a person may be responsible for harm about which he could not
have known finds a parallel in Raz's assertion that an individual may act wrongly even if
there is no better course of action available to him. Both of these claims undermine the
idea that the sole purpose ofjudging people's actions-as responsible or wrong-is to
'influence how they or others similarly situated in the future will choose to act. Both
claims locate normative grounds of judgment beyond the perspective of the choosing
agent. See RAz, supra note 13, at 364.
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aspect of life, often referred to vaguely as "the system," rather than
on those who perpetuate it by their participation, is too often simply
a strategy for covering up the proper location of moral responsibil-
ity. Thus, according to the paradigm of participation, when injury is
caused by another person's actions, the innocence of a victim de-
mands that responsibility fall on the injurer.
At this point it may be helpful to address three objections to the
initial plausibility of this model of responsibility. 22 First, one might
object that if the paradigm of awareness fails properly to account for
the normative relation between those who cause injury and those
who suffer it, this is not simply because it is too restrictive but rather
because the very concept of responsibility is inapplicable to such sit-
uations. A radically skeptical form of this objection might claim that
responsibility itself is an incoherent or wholly fictional concept. 23 A
more restrained version might assert that actions taken without an-
ticipation of some of their consequences really are like natural
events with regard to those unanticipated consequences. 24 If this is
true, then responsibility would not apply to people who perform
such actions any more than it does to the inanimate causal forces of
nature.
While I cannot disprove the radically skeptical objection to re-
sponsibility itself, I can attempt to reveal one important disadvan-
tage of holding such a position.25 One aim of this essay is to
illuminate actual contemporary disagreements in politics and law
concerning responsibility for human suffering. The parties to these
conflicts themselves hold and take seriously conceptions of respon-
sibility. They see ideas about responsibility as legitimate reasons for
action, and they view the outcomes of debates about these ideas as
having practical influence on the way they and others behave and on
the deployment of the state's power to enforce moral norms. A rad-
ically skeptical rejection of responsibility hinders any attempt to illu-
minate what is at stake in these contemporary disagreements in a
way that is intelligible to the parties involved and that respects their
deeply held concerns. Radical skepticism may indeed be true in
22 I intend my accounts of both models of responsibility to be explications, not
defenses, of them. However, an adequate presentation of them requires that they have
at least initial plausibility as alternative approaches to responsibility for human suffering.
23 I am grateful to Tony Sebok for first bringing this objection to my attention.
24 I am grateful to Peter Berkowitz for helping me understand the true force of this
objection.
25 For strategies in addressing radical skepticism, see DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 76-
86 (discussing the difference between "internal" and "external" skepticism and their
respective errors) and THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILrrY OF ALTRUISM 143-44 (1970) ("I
believe that no form of skepticism, whether epistemological or moral, can be shown to
be impossible. The best one can do is to raise its cost, by showing how deep and perva-
sive are the disturbances of thought which it involves.").
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some metaphysical or meta-ethical sense, but it is not very helpful in
addressing present-day practical problems.
The more restrained version of this first objection claims that
responsibility simply does not characterize the normative relation
between human agents and the unforeseen consequences of their
actions. This objection rests on an alleged similarity between
human action without foresight and natural events. The paradigm
of participation, however, claims that the normatively relevant divid-
ing line for the purposes of attributing responsibility falls between
human action (with or without foresight) and natural events. The
presence or absence of a chosen action delineates the bounds of re-
sponsibility in this model. The objection, by likening unfortunate
injury to natural disaster, claims that the normatively relevant dis-
tinction where responsibility is concerned is between human action
with foresight and human action without it. The presence or ab-
sence of awareness thus defines the frontier of responsibility under
this approach. Seen in this light, the objection is really the para-
digm of awareness, posed as an objection to the paradigm of partici-
pation rather than as an alternative to it.26 A full defense of either
one of these two models would have to address this issue of where
to locate the frontier of responsibility, the boundary between injus-
tice and misfortune.27
These considerations do not defeat this more restrained objec-
tion. However, they do reveal that it is simply a restatement of the
26 One might visualize the difference between the two paradigms with the help of
two alternative Venn diagrams:
AWARENESS PARTICIPATION
EVENTS IN THE WORLD
HUMAN ACTIONS
HUMAN ACTIONS WITHQ
FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES
BOUNDARY BETWEEN BOUNDARY BETWEEN
RESPONSIBILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY AND
NO RESPONSIBILITY NO RESPONSIBILITY
27 Claiming that misfortune is better addressed by remedies that do not attribute
responsibility-such as social insurance-does not resolve the question of whether in-
jury caused by action without foresight constitutes injustice or misfortune. To say that
such unforeseen injury is better addressed by remedies that do not attribute responsibil-
ity is to presuppose an answer to this question based upon the paradigm of awareness.
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opposing paradigm of awareness. While such a restatement may
pose an alternative, it does not undermine the initial plausibility of
the paradigm of participation. My purpose here is not to decide be-
tween the two paradigms; it is to highlight that doing so is not sim-
ply a matter of initial impressions but rather requires complex
substantive considerations.
A second objection to the initial plausibility of the paradigm of
participation questions the very distinction between awareness and
participation. 28 A more fitting distinction might be drawn between
responsibility for direct and indirect consequences of one's actions.
Using this distinction one might reformulate the two models of re-
sponsibility as follows:
DIREcT: A person should be responsible only for the immediate
results of her actions.
INDIRECT: A person should be responsible for all results of her
actions even when the connection between act and result is medi-
ated by a complex of natural or social forces.
This distinction between these two alternative paradigms focuses on
the structural nature of the causal relation between actor and suf-
ferer.29 In contrast, the distinction between awareness and partici-
pation emphasizes the difference between how those who cause
injury and those who suffer it perceive the relationship between
themselves.
Clearly there may be considerable overlap between these two
pairs of paradigms. Proponents of the awareness/participation dis-
tinction may claim that directness provides generally reliable evi-
dence for determining what an injurer is (or should have been)
aware of. Adherents of the direct/indirect distinction might claim
that awareness is simply a proxy for directness. This debate over
To say that all injury is better addressed in this way is to adopt the radical skeptic's
approach to which I have responded above.
The separate question of whether social insurance is the appropriate response
raises issues concerning the consequences of responsibility not the grounds of it. See
supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. One might construe insurance as a consequence
of responsibility that attributes responsibility to all contributors to the insurance pool or
as an alternative to attributing responsibility to anyone. This would depend on one's
interpretation of insurance, not responsibility.
28 In the following discussion of this objection, I owe much to conversations with
Ernest Weinrib.
29 Ernest Weinrib has pointed out to me that these two paradigms are characterized
by the same distinction as that between corrective and distributive justice in his work.
See, e.g., Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IowA L. REv. 403 (1992). Weinrib has taken
his observation one step further and asserted that the structural difference between di-
rect and indirect harm necessitates a different account of responsibility for each. Such an
explanation appears consistent with his generally formalist approach to such questions.
See Ernest Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE LJ. 949
(1988).
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which distinction better accounts for competing claims concerning
responsibility arises in tort law, where some define proximate cause
according to directness and others according to foreseeability. 30
Ultimately, both pairs of models are plausible, and favoring one
over the other comes down to deciding which one better explains
contemporary disagreements about responsibility in politics and
law. This essay makes a case for the awareness/participation dichot-
omy. Whether or not that case is convincing mustawait the conclu-
sion of the discussion and judgment by the reader.
A third objection to the initial plausibility of the paradigm of
participation concerns the meaning of innocence. What exactly is it
that makes a victim innocent? Clearly not all those who suffer injury
are innocent. Many victims contribute to their own suffering, and
according to the paradigm of participation, they should be responsi-
ble for it. But does a victim ever not contribute causally to his
suffering?
Stephen Perry argues convincingly that injuries arising from the
interaction of two parties are "always... the result of choices to act
which were made by both parties. ' '3 1 When both parties choose to
act, both contribute causally to the injury.3 2 This being so, causa-
tion alone can never serve as the ground upon which to distinguish
an injurer from a victim on the basis of blameworthiness or inno-
cence. However, Perry does point out that injury may be caused by
only one party in exceptional cases where a victim exercises no
choice with regard to the circumstances of her injury.33 Thus, only
when an injurer participates by choice in a practice that causes in-
jury to a victim who is subject, but not by choice, to the effects of
that practice, does it make sense to conceive of the victim as
innocent.
The extent to which victims in fact exercise little or no choice
concerning the events that lead to their suffering will in the end af-
fect any defense of the paradigm of participation. However, this essay
seeks to explain disagreements over responsibility as due to disparate
understandings of responsibility, understandings given by the para-
digms of awareness and participation. So what matters for the pur-
poses of this discussion is simply whether adherents of the paradigm
of participation believe that it correctly characterizes relations be-
30 See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
31 Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J. L. &JuRISPRU-
DENCE 147, 156 (1988). Perry qualifies this assertion by mentioning two exceptions:
cases in which third parties place a victim's (1) property or (2) person in the way of
harm caused by an injurer. In both instances it is the third party rather than the victim
whose action places the victim in harm's way.
32 Id. at 154-60.
33 Id- at 156.
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tween injurers and victims in particular instances, not whether it is
empirically true.
A situation in which an injurer's chosen participation contrib-
utes to the suffering of a victim who has little or no choice in defin-
ing her part in the interaction constitutes an offense against the
victim's autonomy. Suffering, writes H. Richard Neibuhr, "is the
frustration of our movement toward self-realization[,] ... the pres-
ence in our existence of that which is not under our control .... the
intrusion into our self-legislating existence of an activity operating
under another law than ours ... ."34 The act giving rise to harm is
properly attributable to the injurer; it is "his" insofar as it is an ex-
pression of his autonomy. According to the paradigm of participa-
tion, respect for the victim's autonomy demands that the injurer be
considered responsible for the results of his action. Whether the
injurer was aware of the possibility for harm is irrelevant.
In contrast to the paradigm of awareness, the paradigm of par-
ticipation focuses on the suffering of harm rather than the choice of
action when determining responsibility. It is an ex post, or after-the-
fact, approach to responsibility. The paradigm of participation eval-
uates responsibility from the point of view of the victim as one who
suffers at the hands of others. In doing so, it seeks to rehabilitate
the victim's injured autonomy.
The paradigms of awareness and participation will conflict
whenever one person unknowingly causes harm to another. Cases
of "structural" harm-injuries caused by a complex of natural and
social forces-will often be the object of this conflict. The paradigm
of awareness restricts injurer responsibility to situations in which an
injurer made a knowing decision to subject a victim to harm or
should have known that harm would result from his actions. To do
otherwise would fail to respect the injurer's autonomy. In this way
the paradigm of awareness privileges the injurer's autonomy over
that of the victim. In contrast, the paradigm of participation extends
injurer responsibility to circumstances in which a victim's suffering
results from an injurer's decision to act, no matter how unforesee-
able the harm. Not recognizing the injurer's responsibility would
fail to rehabilitate the victim's damaged autonomy. Thus, the para-
digm of participation favors the victim's autonomy over that of the
injurer.
The less expansive character of responsibility under the para-
digm of awareness leaves many victims subject to the further degra-
dation of having nowhere to place responsibility; it adds injustice to
suffering. At worst it blames the victim. At best it blames "the sys-
34 H. RICHARD NEIBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF 60 (1963).
[Vol. 78:470482
ESSAY-HUMAN SUFFERING
tem"-an impersonal amorphous entity-and allows active partici-
pants to hide behind the complexity of doing harm in the modern
world.
The paradigm of participation dramatically expands each ac-
tor's responsibility for the suffering of others. It threatens to over-
whelm simple daily activities that somehow, in some small way
contribute causally to suffering beyond the field of one's conscious-
ness. The notion of opportunity cost in economics, according to
which everything always has a cost (equal to whatever one forgoes to
have it), entails that nothing is ever free. Similarly, the understand-
ing of responsibility given by the paradigm of participation has a
pervasiveness that seems to threaten the possibility that any act can
be innocent. This calls into question the practical import of a re-
sponsibility defined so expansively that it serves to link one's actions
to injuries about which one has no knowledge, suffered by people
with whom one has no acquaintance.
Thus, the paradigms of awareness and participation each pro-
tect fundamental moral values, and each also contains unsettling
flaws. My aim in this part of the discussion has not been to defend
one over the other, but rather to reveal the plausibility of both. I
have sought only to outline the salient features of each model in a
way that is recognizable to those who hold it. However, I have not
attempted to fortify either one against serious objections by those
who have adopted its rival. Doing so would require constructing
substantive theories a good deal more detailed than those held by
most adherents to either paradigm. While individuals may have
deep convictions concerning their understandings of responsibility,
these are rarely rooted in detailed philosophical analysis. My goal is
descriptive rather than justificatory. . hope by this analytic clarifica-
tion to illuminate the source of normative conflict in many contem-
porary political and legal disagreements. With the paradigms of
awareness and participation in mind, consider next how they shed
light on two illustrative political conflicts concerning responsibility
for human suffering.
II
Two EXAMPLES OF THE TENSION BETWEEN AWARENESS
AND PARTICIPATION: RESPONSIBILITY FOR RACISM
AND IMPERIALISM
The difference between the paradigms of awareness and partici-
pation underlies many disagreements about responsibility for
human suffering. Contemporary discussions about racism and im-
perialism provide examples of how this difference creates a form of
discourse that more often resembles miscommunication than de-
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bate. Perhaps examination of these issues in light of the distinction
between paradigms can make the discourse more meaningful.
Racial inequality in the United States has given rise to much
discussion of responsibility for racism. Consider the following hy-
pothetical dialogue between a black student and a white student:
B: All whites are racist.
W: I'm not a racist.
B: Yes, you are. You're a racist because you're responsible for
racial oppression.
W: That's not fair. I am not responsible for racial oppression. In
fact, I have never done anything to injure or exploit black people.
You've insulted my character.
B: This is not about your character, it's about the suffering of my
people. You obviously don't care about my concerns. You don't
respect me.
This type of exchange, rather than fostering open discussion be-
tween the two parties, results instead in a breakdown of
communication.
B claims that W is a racist because he is "responsible for racial
oppression." W's response is to deny the claim, asserting that he
has "never done anything to injure or exploit black people." W's
answer presupposes an understanding of responsibility consistent
with the paradigm of awareness. Having never done anything to
harm black people-or more precisely, not being aware of ever hav-
ing done anything to harm black people-would preclude W from
responsibility under this paradigm. However, if B's accusation is
rooted in an understanding of responsibility more akin to the para-
digm of participation, then W's answer is a non-response.3 5 B may
even perceive it as a strategy for avoiding discussion.
B's accusation and W's response represent a failure to join is-
sue. Their mutual misperceptions ultimately result in a complete
breakdown in communication. W claims that B has insulted his
character. Perhaps he feels that B has simply lumped him in with
other whites-the "real" racists-on the basis of his skin color. Or
maybe he feels that B has failed to give him credit for moral choices
that he has made in the past to avoid harming black people when he
was aware of a potential for doing so. Under both of these interpre-
tations, W understands B's accusation as an expression of disregard
for his autonomy, his status as an individual moral agent.
B claims that W does not respect her. B may interpret W's fail-
ure to respond to her concern as a lack of interest, or worse, an
35 Patricia Williams has called this "the privatized response to issues of racial ac-
countability." See her illuminating discussion of it in PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE AL-
CHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 64-66 (1991).
[Vol. 78:470484
ESSA Y-HUMAN SUFFERING
affirmative attempt to ignore it. W's unresponsive answer diverts
the discussion from B's initial claim to W's feelings about it. B may
feel that W is unwilling to consider an issue that is important to her,
and avoids doing so by refocusing their interaction on himself and
his own feelings. If B perceives W's reaction in these ways, then she
will feel that W does not respect her autonomy, that he is unwilling
even to recognize her as an individual insofar as she has concerns
that differ from his.
W's perception that B disregards his autonomy and B's percep-
tion that W refuses to recognize hers make meaningful communica-
tion difficult, if not altogether impossible. Conversation entails
speaking and being heard, giving others an opportunity to talk and
listening to them; it requires recognition of and respect for the
other party. Exchanges like the one between B and W illustrate how
the difference between the paradigms of awareness and participa-
tion can lead to a breakdown of communication and exacerbate so-
cial division.
The difference in these two paradigms also frustrates attempts
to communicate meaningfully about injustices other than racism.3 6
Experiences while doing service work in third world countries have
led some people to identify connections between standards of living
in the United States and those in other poorer countries. The con-
cept of responsibility provides one form of connection between
middle-class Americans and mistreated workers in other countries.
For example, several popular U.S. clothing manufacturers ship
material to Guatemala where local women assemble it under op-
pressive working conditions. The places where these women work
are called maquiladoras, the Spanish term for assembly plant. The
Central America Network Newsletter of Cleveland recently reported that
some maquiladora employees earn as little as one dollar per day and
most work at least fifty hours each week. 37 Describing the atmos-
phere in the maquiladoras, the report continued:
[T]he factories of Guatemala offer abysmal working conditions.
Warehouse-like buildings have few windows or fans, no heat, and
limited exits, which ... are usually locked.
Part of the business attraction of maquiladoras lies in the lack
of health, safety and environmental standards which allows com-
panies to operate relatively free of regulation. Workers in Guate-
36 I do not mean to suggest in this discussion that there are not connections be-
tween racism and imperialism, but only to indicate that they do have distinguishing
features.
37 Fast Track to Poverty, C.A.N. NEWSL. (Cent. Am. Network, Cleveland, Ohio), No.
31, Spring 1992, at 4 [hereinafter C.A.N. NEwsL.]. For a detailed study of the Guatema-
lan maquiladoras, see Kurt Peterson, The Maquiladora Revolution in Guatemala, Schell
Center Occasional Paper No. 2 (1992).
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mala are not given health and safety training or protection against
toxic chemicals and dust emitted when working with dyed cloth.
Reports of sexual and physical abuse are frequent....
Efforts to counter abuses and to fight for fair wages by form-
ing unions are vigorously repressed.... The Guatemalan military
and security forces are frequently used to break up union meet-
ings, strikes or demonstrations.3 8
Few would dispute the unfairness of this treatment. However, the
difficult issue arises when dealing with the question of whether U.S.
consumers, who purchase the clothes made in these maquiladoras at
affordable3 9 prices, are responsible for the labor repression involved
in producing them.40
The paradigms of awareness and participation unsurprisingly
offer different answers to this question. A U.S. consumer whose un-
derstanding of responsibility reflects the paradigm of awareness
might readily condemn the maquiladora industry, blaming the Guate-
malan military, the factory owners, and perhaps even the U.S. manu-
facturers, while refusing to consider himself responsible. He might
claim:
I didn't even know about it before now, so how could I be respon-
sible for it? Moreover, I don't know which of my clothes, if any,
are assembled in Guatemala, and it would be unreasonable to ex-
pect me to know where everything I purchase comes from. I im-
agine that most of what we as Americans consume involves
foreign labor at some stage of production. And although I abhor
the unfair working conditions under which many of these goods
are produced, it is unrealistic to expect me to accept responsibility
for world-wide labor oppression. I'd have to stop buying clothes,
and many other essential goods too, if that were the case. That's
clearly impractical for me, and probably not even helpful to the
workers.
This understanding of the problem of human suffering in the Guate-
malan maquiladoras need not involve indifference, only a refusal to
bear responsibility for something properly attributable to the ac-
tions of others more directly and foreseeably involved. Responsibil-
ity under the paradigm of awareness, as manifest in this example,
demands a more direct connection between injurer and victim.
Such directness is missing here because the causal link between con-
sumer and worker seems to disappear in the complexity of an inter-
38 C.A.N. NEWSL., supra note 37, at 6-7.
39 These clothes are affordable for U.S. consumers, that is.
40 For a provocative meditation on the connection between "the blood-soaked
fields of El Salvador" and blouses at Sears "on sale for 20% discount," see BERNICE J.
REAGON, Are My Hands Clean?, on SWEET HONEY IN THE ROCK Lrv AT CARNEGIE HALL
(Flying Fish Records 1988).
486 [Vol. 78:470
ESSAY-HUMAN SUFFERING
national manufacturing process. This causal connection appears so
tenuous that it seems unreasonable to expect the consumer to be
aware of it. If this type of complex causal connection is indeed as
common as this consumer asserts, then to expect awareness is to
demand omniscience.
In contrast, a consumer whose understanding of responsibility
reflects the paradigm of participation might readily accept responsi-
bility. She might explain:
It is my participation in U.S. consumer markets that creates and
sustains them. And these markets help to fuel all sorts of unfair
labor conditions. Given the complexity of international markets,
one could not possibly be aware of all connections between what
one buys and the conditions under which it is made. Neverthe-
less, despite my ignorance, my consumption of clothing assem-
bled in Guatemala is part of what causes the dreadful working
conditions in the maquiladoras there. Clearly, the factory owners
and the Guatemalan military are more directly responsible for the
oppression of maquiladora workers. However in ways about which
I can never be completely clear, my investments support the man-
ufacturers, and my tax dollars pay for the training and arming of
the military. It seems hard to imagine a way of extricating myself
from this responsibility and others like it short of picking up and
quitting the United States altogether.
This analysis may not provide a clearer response to the problem of
how to address suffering in the maquiladoras than the previous one,
but it does characterize the normative link between consumer and
worker in a significantly different way. The sense of responsibility
expressed here may provide additional reasons for acting in ways
that aim to overcome maquiladora worker oppression. Equally im-
portant, it may entail a radically new self-understanding, grounded
on a different sense of one's place in the world with regard to others
and one's connection to them.
In this example, both consumers express a similar sense of
powerlessness in the face of the pervasiveness of their connection to
labor exploitation. However, due to their disparate understandings
of responsibility, this shared sense may in the end lead to another
perhaps less practical difference between them. While the first con-
sumer sees his inability to anticipate and change the harm to which
his consumption contributes as defeating responsibility, the second
consumer does not. Given their shared sense of powerlessness, the
difference between them may simply boil down to distinct emotional
responses: the paradigm of awareness leading to a feeling of excul-
pation and the paradigm of participation to despair.
I believe that conflict between the paradigms of awareness and
participation lies at the heart of many contemporary political dis-
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agreements, as it does in these hypothetical discussions of racism
and imperialism. Tort law, which expresses state-sponsored under-
standings of responsibility, exhibits this tension. The following part
examines the disparity between the two paradigms within tort
doctrine.
III
THE TENSION BETWEEN THE PARADIGMS OF AWARENESS
AND PARTICIPATION IN TORT LAW
The traditional procedural structure and doctrinal require-
ments of tort law reflect an allegiance to the paradigm of awareness.
The matching of a single defendant directly to a single plaintiff in a
bilateral proceeding and the requirement of proximate cause as a
condition of liability are two ways in which tort law favors an under-
standing of responsibility based on awareness. However, not all tort
trials are two-party bilateral proceedings, and doctrinal require-
ments are far from set in stone when it comes to complex issues of
causal connection. In exceptional cases, in which, for instance,
courts decide complex multi-party issues or drop proximate cause
requirements, they recognize and enforce the paradigm of participa-
tion. These exceptions engender much debate, and this disagree-
ment stems largely from the tension between the paradigms of
awareness and participation.
Before examining this conflict, it may be helpful to state briefly
the relation between moral and legal responsibility that I presup-
pose throughout the following discussion.4 1 I have chosen to inter-
pret principles of legal responsibility presented in tort doctrine as a
subset of moral principles of responsibility. Judges who assert prin-
ciples of legal responsibility, in the opinions that follow, often make
claims about the moral legitimacy of these principles, speaking in
terms such as "fairness," "innocence," and "wrongdoing." These
terms pervade judicial analyses in tort law. I will accept these claims
at face value as moral claims.42 One might instead interpret doctri-
nal language as articulating pragmatic policies (justified by refer-
ence to a particular political theory of institutions and entitlements)
that are independent of moral theories about responsibility. 43 Both
41 A full theory of the relationship between morality and law is well beyond the
modest aims of the present discussion. Perhaps equally to the point, I do not have such
a theory.
42 Many contemporary tort theorists have offered interpretations of tort law that
see the structure and doctrines of tort law as expressing moral principles. Theories of
tort law as an expression of various ideals of "corrective justice" are perhaps the most
prominent. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 4 at 373; Weinrib, supra note 5.
43 For an especially interesting example of this approach to tort law, see Jerry L.
Mashaw, A Comment on Causation, Law Reform, and Guerrilla Warfare, 73 GEO. LJ. 1393,
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of these approaches mayilluminate judicial opinions. I have, for my
purposes here, chosen to adopt the former. With this in mind, con-
sider a central doctrinal feature of tort liability.
The requirement of proximate cause-that a victim's injuries be
reasonably foreseeable from the injurer's ex ante perspective-re-
flects the condition of anticipation in the paradigm of awareness. In
the following analysis, I consider proximate cause to be a condition
of liability distinct from cause-in-fact. Following Richard Wright, I
interpret proximate cause as providing a limit to the scope of liabil-
ity wholly independent of causal considerations. 44 Proximate cause
is normally a condition of liability under both negligence and strict
liability.45 Language from several classic46 tort opinions reflects this
paradigm.
In Overseas Tankship (U.K) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co.,
Ltd. (Wagon Mound No. 1),47 the court wrote:
It is a principle of civil liability... that a man must be considered
to be responsible for the probable consequences of his act. To
demand more of him is too harsh a rule.... [I]f it is asked why a
man should be responsible for the natural or necessary or prob-
able consequences of his act ... the answer is that it is not because
they are natural or necessary or probable, but because, since they
have this quality, it is judged by the standard of the reasonable
man, that he ought to have foreseen them.48
Holding an individual liable only for harm that he could have fore-
seen, continued the court, "corresponds with the common con-
science of mankind. . . .49 Removing this foreseeability
requirement "leads to nowhere but the never ending and insoluble
problems of causation." 50 Thus, the court considered that any at-
tempt to impose liability beyond the restricted area of that which
1395 (1985) ("I am tempted to suggest that in the toxic torts context we should describe
the tort system as primarily a system of guerrilla warfare [designed to spur law
reform].").
44 Wright, supra note 12, at 1741-42.
45 Fletcher, supra note 15, at 77-79 (citing Madsen v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 125 P.2d
794, 795 (Utah 1942) ("[Ihe results chargeable to the nonnegligent user of explosives
are those things ordinarily resulting from an explosion." "Ordinarily resulting" here is
a proxy for reasonable foreseeability.)).
46 1 consider these cases "classic" insofar as they are included in the widely used
casebook by William L. Prosser. See Wir..m L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS (8th ed. 1988).
47 [1961] App. Cas. 388 (P.C.) (Austl.) [hereinafter Wagon Mound No. 1], excerpted in
PROSSER ET AL., supra note 46, at 297 (The freighter Wagon Mound, belonging to de-
fendants, was moored 600 feet from plaintiff's dock. A large quantity of oil was dis-
charged negligently from the freighter. The oil was ignited, resulting in a fire that
damaged plaintiff's wharf and two ships docked alongside it.).
48 Id. at 422-23.
49 Id. at 423.
50 Id.
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one reasonably could have considered when choosing to act
threatened to extend far too radically the legal notion of
responsibility. 5'
A century before The Wagon Mound No. 1, a New York courtjusti-
fied the limits on liability imposed by the paradigm of awareness by
a similar reference to the overwhelming expansion of responsibility
entailed by the paradigm of participation. In Ryan v. New York Cen-
tral Railroad Co. ,52 the court considered the issue of liability for fire
spreading from one house to another. It held that a defendant
ought to be liable for the destruction of a building caused by his
setting fire to it, since "the result was to have been anticipated, the
moment the fire was communicated to the building. . ,,"5 How-
ever, the court limited liability to this first building, asserting that
defendant ought not be liable for additional damages caused as the
fire spread. Posing a hypothetical, it wrote:
A man may insure his own house, or his own furniture, but he
cannot insure his neighbor's building or furniture, for the reason
that he has no interest in them. To hold that the owner must not
only meet his own loss by fire, but that he must guarantee the
security of his neighbors on both sides, and to an unlimited ex-
tent, would be to create a liability which would be the destruction
of all civilized society. No community could long exist, under the
operation of such a principle. 54
According to the court, the expansiveness of liability beyond what
one could anticipate would lead to "destruction" worse even than
that threatened by the fire. This fear may be due in part to the prac-
tical effect of legal responsibility-payment of money damages.
However, it may also reflect the court's uncertainty as to what such
an extensive web of responsibility would look like.
The court's rhetoric reflects a desire not only to restrict liability
to damage that one can anticipate but also to privilege the injurer's
perspective, an implicit feature of the paradigm of awareness. An
injurer, reasoned the court, ought not be held responsible for dam-
age that he caused to his neighbor's house, since he "has no inter-
est" in it. Determining the scope of responsibility based on the
51 For a U.S. court's statement of this rule, see Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., 9 So. 2d
780, 781 (Miss. 1942) ("The area within which liability is imposed is that which is within
the circle of reasonable foreseeability .... ).
52 35 N.Y. 210 (1866), quoted in PROSSER ET AL., supra note 46, at 289 (The defen-
dant railroad company negligently set fire to its own woodshed, resulting in destruction
of plaintiff's house 130 feet away.).
53 Id. at 212.
54 Id. at 216-17.
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interests of the injurer favors his view of the situation over the
victim's. 55
Tort doctrine may reflect the limit imposed on legal responsi-
bility by the paradigm of awareness using proximate cause language
other than that of foreseeability. In In re Polemis,56 which rejected
the reasonably foreseeable test later rehabilitated in Wagon Mound
No. 1, Bankes, L.J., stated that
Given the breach of duty ... and given the damage as a direct
result of that negligence, the anticipations of the person whose
negligent act has produced the damage appear to me to be irrele-
vant. I consider that the damages claimed are not too remote [to
attribute responsibility for them to the defendant]. 57
Scrutton, LJ., added that an individual is responsible for any dam-
ages that "his negligent act directly caused," whether foreseeable or
not.58 Strictly speaking, this would seem to place liability under the
proximate cause test of direct harm outside of the scope of responsi-
bility for awareness.
However, as the Wagon Mound No. 1 court argued, directness is
often a way of expressing that resulting harm was near enough caus-
ally to an injurer's action that she should have anticipated it. That
is, directness is really a test for reasonable foreseeability, without
regard to whether the injurer actually foresaw the possibility of
harm. In addition, responsibility in cases of "remote" suffering
commonly highlights the difference between the paradigms of
awareness and participation.
Proximate cause is not the only doctrinal device available to re-
strict legal responsibility according to the paradigm of awareness.
In Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad,59 Justice Cardozo held that an in-
jurer is negligent, and therefore can be liable, only when he wrongs
a foreseeable victim. Discussing the duty of care, violation of which
defines negligence, Cardozo asserted that "the orbit of the danger
55 However, the "eggshell skull" doctrine-where the extent of damages for which
the defendant is responsible depends upon the victim's injury-favors the victim's per-
spective. Note, however, that even when a victim has an eggshell skull, if the injury is
not foreseeable, then the injurer will not be liable. See Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 481
N.Y.S.2d 545 (1984), quoted in PROSSER ET AL., supra note 46, at 292-94.
56 [1921] 3 K.B. 560, quoted in PROSSER ET AL., supra note 46, at 295 (Defendants
chartered a ship from plaintiffs. Due to defendants' negligence, a heavy plank fell into a
hole in which petrol was being stored, resulting in an explosion that destroyed the
ship.).
57 Id at 572.
58 Id. at 577.
59 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), quoted in PROSSER Er AL., supra note 46, at 304 (Emlloy-
ees of the defendant's railroad assisted a man in boarding a train while it was moving. In
this process, the man dropped a package containing fireworks. The fireworks exploded,
knocking over some scales at the other end of the boarding platform that resulted in
injury to the plaintiff.).
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as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of
the duty." 60 Thus, to harm an unforeseeable victim would not con-
stitute negligence and would therefore not give rise to legal respon-
sibility for the injury. According to this holding, foreseeability is a
test for negligence, not for proximate cause.
Justice Andrews argued in dissent that an individual's duty of
care is not limited to foreseeable victims; he asserted that one can
commit negligence by harming even an unanticipated victim.6 1
However, he nonetheless limited legal responsibility using the tradi-
tional foreseeability test for proximate cause.62 While much has
been written concerning the difference between these two posi-
tions, 63 for the purposes of this analysis they appear remarkably
similar. Both limit an injurer's legal responsibility to what she could
have reasonably foreseen at the time of her decision to act. Both
Cardozo's and Andrews's Palsgraf opinions manifest an allegiance to
the paradigm of awareness.
The above cases articulate the normal proximate cause require-
ment of tort law: an injurer is legally responsible for a harm that she
causes only if she could have reasonably anticipated it when consid-
ering how to act. When courts in exceptional cases waive the proxi-
mate cause requirement, they reveal that responsibility in tort law
may occasionally conform to the paradigm of participation. While
some instances of liability without proximate cause reside safely
within the borders of accepted tort practice, others serve to define
the frontier of legal responsibility for harm to others. The following
discussion provides four examples of tort doctrines that conform to
the paradigm of participation-the first offers a well-established
rule, the second signals a growing trend, the third represents a lone
case, and the fourth constitutes a hotly debated theory of liability
still rejected by the courts.
Consider first the case of dram-shop liability. Traditionally at
common law, a dram-shop owner was not responsible for injuries
caused by an intoxicated individual to whom he had sold liquor.
60 Id. at 100.
61 Id. at 102 ("Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from
unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or C alone.").
62 Id. at 102-03.
63 See, e.g., Thomas A. Cowan, The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case, 23 MINN. L. REV. 46, 53
(1938) ("Both judges require the breach of a duty of care as an element of liability for
negligence. They differ in the way they determine the existence of the duty."); Charles
0. Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from Rationalization, 6 U. CH. L. REV.
36, 47 (1938) ("These different approaches to the extension of liability for negligence
represent different views of policy concerning the desirable legal incidence of negli-
gence."); William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953) (contrasting
the majority's "scope of the risk" approach with the dissent's "direct causation" ap-
proach and discussing the limitations of each).
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Courts generally explained that the drinker's consumption, rather
than the owner's sale of alcohol, was, as a matter of law, the proxi-
mate cause of the victim's injury.64 The drinker's decision to in-
dulge excessively qualified him for responsibility under the
paradigm of awareness. But why didn't the owner's decision to sell
the liquor, especially if the drinker were already visibly intoxicated,
make the owner responsible? Surely an owner ought to anticipate
the possibility of harm to a third party as a result of selling liquor to
an intoxicated patron.
Legislatures and courts responded to this common-law defi-
ciency in two ways. Some simply granted the victim an opportunity
to prove that a dram-shop owner was the proximate cause of her
injury. They thereby reversed the traditional rule by statute65 or
judicial opinion.66 These jurisdictions offered victims a chance to
establish owners' legal responsibility in a manner fully consistent
with the general approach provided by the paradigm of awareness.
Another response to dram-shop immunity was to waive the
proximate cause requirement altogether.67 Some states considered
it so difficult to draw a direct or foreseeable causal connection be-
tween an owner's sale and a victim's injury at the hands of an intoxi-
cated patron that they allowed for liability without it. "[Tihere is no
requirement, in a dram shop case," held the Iowa Supreme Court in
Walton v. Stokes, "for a plaintiff to show the serving [of liquor to an
intoxicated patron] was a proximate cause of his injuries by the in-
64 See Nolan v. Morelli, 226 A.2d 383, 386 (Conn. 1967) (outlining the history of
the Connecticut Dramshop Act).
65 See, e.g., CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1992); MicH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (West 1978); Onio RE v. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Anderson 1989); 61
O.JUR. 3D § 390 (interpreting OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4399.01); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 4-497 (West Supp. 1992).
66 See, e.g., Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983); Paula v. Gagnon, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 702 (Cal. App. 1978), rev'd by statute CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1985).
67 See, e.g., Kavorkian v. Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc., 711 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1985);
Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981), overruled by Kavorkian v. Tommy's Elbow
Room, Inc., 711 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1985) (both interpreting ALAsKA STAT. § 04.21.020
(1986); Sanders v. Officers' Club of Conn., Inc., 397 A.2d 122 (Conn. 1978) (all inter-
preting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1990)); Nelson v. Steffens, 365 A.2d
1174 (Conn. 1976), overruled by Ely v. Murphy, 540 A.2d 54 (Conn. 1988); Nolan v.
Morelli, 226 A.2d 383 (Conn. 1967); Lavieri v. Ulysses, 180 A.2d 632 (Conn. 1962);
Pierce v. Albanese, 129 A.2d 606 (Conn. 1957); London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v.
Duryea, 119 A.2d 325 (Conn. 1955); Tresch v. Nielsen, 207 N.E.2d 109 (Ill. App. 2d
1965); Cope v. Gepford, 61 N.E.2d 394 (Il1. App. 1945);'Hill v. Alexander, 53 N.E.2d
307 (Il. App. 1944); Spousta v. Berger, 231 Ill. App. 454 (1923) (all interpreting ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135, § 6-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992)); Thorp v. Casey's Gen.
Stores, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1989); Walton v. Stokes, 270 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa
1978); Bisfline v. Ney Bros., 111 N.W. 422 (Iowa 1907) (all interpreting IowA CODE
ANN. § 123.92 (West 1987)); Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Soc.,
340 N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); McNally v. Addis, 317 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Misc. 2d
1970) (both interpreting N.Y. GEN OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1989)).
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toxicated person."6 8 In this case, the court was interpreting the
state's dram-shop liability statute. In a later case, Thorp v. Casey's
General Stores, Inc., the same court went even farther, asserting that
"liability for the sale and serving of alcoholic beverages to an intoxi-
cated person does not require a showing that he subsequently con-
sumed them." 69 But how could the court justify holding an owner
liable for injuries that his sale did not even cause, proximately or
otherwise?
Contrary to appearances, there is a causal link in Thorp between
sale and injury; it is a complex one, not proximate but mediated
through a web of relations. The court assumed a causal link be-
tween the defendant dram-shop owner's sale of liquor to an intoxi-
cated person as part of a general practice that promotes such sales
and the particular sale that resulted in the victim's injury. 70 The
court explicitly recognized this, explaining that dram-shop liability
is "extremely difficult to prove by traditional methods."' 7 1 Indeed,
the purpose of the Dram Shop Act, as explicated in Walton, "is to
obviate the difficulty, amounting oftentimes to an absolute impossi-
bility, of connecting the act of the dram shop operator and the
injury." 72
Why might the state have removed the requirement of estab-
lishing proximate causal connection between the defendant dram-
shop owner and victim? One possibility is that this is a purely penal
statute, seeking only to punish and thereby to "discourage the sell-
ing of excess liquor."73 But if this were the case, what would ac-
68 270 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Iowa 1978) (where the plaintiff sought recovery under
the Dram Shop Act for injuries sustained in an altercation with another intoxicated pa-
tron on the defendant's premises).
69 446 N.W.2d 457, 467 (Iowa 1989) (reversing the plaintiff's summary judgment
where the defendant had allegedly sold intoxicating liquor to a third person who became
intoxicated and fatally injured the plaintiff's son).
70 In more precise terms, the Iowa court assumed the existence of a set of actual
antecedent conditions sufficient to bring about the victim's injury, a set including the
dram-shop owner's sale of the liquor in this case such that this particular sale was a
necessary element of the set. For instance, one might construe the sale as promoting an
environment in which the intoxicant considered driving while under the influence to be
normal or reasonable behavior. What matters here is the court's assumptions concern-
ing cause. The purpose of my analysis is to reveal the court's adherence to the paradigm
of participation, not to provide a defense of it. Id. at 466. For a definition of this notion
of causation (NESS causation), see supra note 12.
71 Thorp, 446 N.W.2d at 467.
72 I believe that the court refers to a practical impossibility of producing adequate
evidence, not a theoretical impossibility of drawing a causal connection between the sale
and the injury. Walton, 270 N.W.2d at 628.
73 Thorp, 446 N.W.2d at 467. For other discussions of the penal nature of dram-
shop liability, see Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 677 (Alaska 1981) ("Accepting an
argument that bar owners cannot be held liable for continuing to serve an intoxicated
patron because the patron would have committed the same acts without the additional
alcohol would be contrary to the public policy at stake in prohibiting service to intoxi-
ESSA Y-HUMAN SUFFERING
count for the state allowing a victim to recover for her injury from a
dram-shop owner upon proof that the owner sold liquor to an intox-
icated person who caused her injury? 74
If tort liability is a state-enforced attribution of responsibility,
the answer must be that, under some understanding of responsibil-
ity, the owner is responsible for the victim's suffering. The para-
digm of participation provides just such an understanding of
responsibility. Because an owner participates in the practice of sell-
ing liquor to intoxicated persons who impose injury on (relatively)
innocent victims, he.is responsible for their suffering. That is, the
owner's liability is founded upon an assumption that his sale caus-
ally contributed to the victim's injury without regard to the foresee-
ability or directness of the link. Does this understanding of legal
responsibility clash with tort law's traditional approach? Yes, it
most certainly does. Is it beyond the bounds of what is acceptable in
a system of law dedicated to fairness? No, for in Pierce v. Albanese,
the Connecticut Supreme Court held that dram-shop liability not
requiring a showing of proximate cause between the sale and injury
was "not arbitrary or unreasonable" or "unconstitutional. '75
A second example of tort liability doctrine that conforms to the
paradigm of participation occurs in litigation arising out of the Fed-
eral Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA).76 This act places liability for costs associ-
ated with clean-up of a hazardous waste site on those who produce
and transport such substances and on those who own and operate
disposal facilities. 77 According to the court in United States v. Wade,
"the Act is intended to facilitate the prompt clean-up of hazardous
waste dump sites and when possible to place the ultimate financial
burden upon those responsible for the danger created by such
sites." 78
In Wade, the federal government sought recovery of costs asso-
ciated with the clean-up of a hazardous waste site from several par-
cated persons."), overruled by Kavorkian v. Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc., 711 P.2d 521
(Alaska 1985); Lavieri v. Ulysses, 180 A.2d 632, 635 (Conn. 1962) ("We have said that
the Dram Shop Act, although in a sense penal, is primarily remedial in nature."); Pierce
v. Albanese, 129 A.2d 606, 612-13 (Conn. 1962) ("The obvious purpose of the [dram-
shop] legislation is to aid the enforcement of § 4293 by imposing a penalty prescribed in
that section, and to protect the public." However, the court also stated that "[t]he gen-
eral view is that such legislation is remedial in character and that it should be liberally
construed 'to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.' ").
74 Plaintiff must, in such cases, prove that defendant sold liquor to an intoxicated
person but need not establish that the intoxicated person consumed it.
75 Pierce, 129 A.2d at 613.
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1989).
77 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1989).
78 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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ties, including the waste producer, transporter, and disposal facility
owner. Interpreting CERCLA, the court wrote:
the statute appears to impose liability on a generator [of waste]
who has (1) disposed of its hazardous substances (2) at a facility
which now contains hazardous substances of the sort disposed of
by the generator (3) if there is a release of that or some other type
of hazardous substance (4) which causes the incurrence of re-
sponse [i.e. clean-up] costs. Thus, the release which results in the
incurrence of response costs and liability need only be of "a" haz-
ardous substance and not necessarily one contained in the de-
fendant's waste. The only required nexus between the defendant
and the site is that the defendant have dumped his waste there
and that the hazardous substances found in the defendant's waste
are also found at the site.79
As this passage indicates, legal responsibility for waste site clean-up
attaches to any generator who deposits hazardous waste at the facil-
ity. Liability attaches even if the generator's waste was not the initial
or primary reason for the clean-up.80 Furthermore, the government
need not prove that the particular generator's waste was actually
present at the site at the time that clean-up commenced.' Finally,
even if the generator did not select the site, it may be held responsi-
ble under CERCLA.8 2 Legal responsibility for hazardous waste
dumping under CERCLA thus rests upon a generator's participa-
tion in the dumping of hazardous substances at the site in question,
regardless of how substantially, directly, or knowingly it is con-
nected with the substances that were actually the subject of the
clean-up. In other words, proximate cause is not a condition for
CERCLA liability.83
79 Id. at 1333.
80 Id. at 1333-34; see also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 689 F.
Supp. 1223, 1225-26 (D. Mass. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1989); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283,
1288-91 (D. R.I. 1986), aft'd, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Ottati &
Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1402 (D. N.H. 1985), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 900
F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc.,
653 F. Supp. 984, 991-92 (D. S.C. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 858 F.2d 160
(4th Cir. 1988).
81 United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (E.D. Mo. 1987) ("[lit is immate-
rial whether the dioxin and TCP present in the waste were generated by [defendant] in
its manufacturing... or the earlier production of Agent Orange by [another manufac-
turer] because section 107(a)(3) [of CERCLA] encompasses both generators of waste
and those who merely arrange for the disposal of waste.").
82 Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1333 n.3.
83 See Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1309-10:
[The] structure of CERCIA and its legislative history make it clear that
traditional tort notions, such as proximate cause, do not apply.... More-
over, the practical limits on analytic techniques argue for a weaker causa-
tion standard .... After leaving a generator's plant, the wastes may be
transferred through several intermediaries, some of whom are unknown
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CERCLA does provide a defense that will exonerate a genera-
tor of waste if release of the hazardous substance was due to the
fault of a third party and if the generator:
(a) ... exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such
hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circum-
stances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions .... 84
This looks very much like the paradigm of awareness-no responsi-
bility if the dumper took reasonable precaution against all foresee-
able consequences-considered as a defense against, instead of an
element of, liability. However, one commentator has claimed that
this defense "is available only when the party can show it was 'totally
blameless'8 5 or that the party can affirmatively demonstrate 'that a
"totally unrelated third party is the sole cause of the release." ' "86
Thus, while the language of the defense appears to adhere to the
paradigm of awareness, it will not, in practice, exonerate defendants
with an even minimal level of participation in hazardous waste
dumping at the site.
Further reflecting the paradigm of participation, courts have
recognized that CERCLA favors the perspective of those who po-
tentially suffer from and those who initially must clean up hazardous
waste facilities over that of the generators of waste. One court ob-
served that CERCLA "is not a legislative scheme which places high
priority on fairness to generators of hazardous waste." 8 7 Fairness in
the eyes of victims according to the paradigm of participation may
entail unfairness from the perspective of injurers according to the
paradigm of awareness.
A third example of tort liability that reflects the paradigm of
participation has occurred in product liability litigation over the
to the generator, before the ultimate disposal of the waste. After
disposal, the wastes may migrate and mingle with the wastes of others.
Therefore, in the case of generators, courts have required only a weak
showing of causation.
IML
84 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) (1989). This defense is available to anyone subject to
CERCLA liability.
85 United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 554 (W.D.
N.Y. 1988).
86 LoreleiJ. Borland, Superfund, in BAsIcs OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (1991), at 21, 26
(PLI Real Estate Practice Course Handbook Series No. 373, 1991) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 554-55
(W.D. N.Y. 1988) and O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 728 (D. R.I. 1988), aff'd 883
F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D.
Cal. 1987))).
87 United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 686 (D. N.J. 1989).
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drug diethylstilbestrol (DES). In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,88 the
New York Court of Appeals ruled that a DES manufacturer's partici-
pation in the marketing of DES for pregnancy-related use anywhere
in the nation could be the basis of liability for resulting injuries.
Plaintiffs in this case sued a group of DES manufacturers, seeking
damages for injuries that resulted from their mothers' use of DES
during pregnancy.8 9
Due to a long time lag of many years between ingestion of the
drug and discovery of resulting harms, it was not possible to draw a
proximate causal link between a particular manufacturer's sale and a
particular plaintiff's injury. So the court allowed liability to rest
upon proof that a defendant-manufacturer had participated in the
national market for DES aimed at promoting it for pregnancy-
related use. Legal responsibility required no showing of proximate
cause. In the court's own words:
To be sure, a defendant cannot be held liable if it did not
participate in the marketing of DES for pregnancy use.... Never-
theless, because liability here is based on the over-all risk pro-
duced, and not causation in a single case, there should be no
exculpation of a defendant who, although a member of the market
producing DES for pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a
particular plaintiff's injury. It is merely a windfall for a producer
to escape liability solely because it manufactured a more identifi-
able pill, or sold only to certain drugstores. These fortuities in no
way diminish the culpability of a defendant for marketing the
product, which is the basis of liability here.90
DES cases before Hymowitz had shifted the burden of proof concern-
ing direct causal connection between sale and injury,9 1 but never
before had a court considered such a proximate causal connection
altogether irrelevant to legal responsibility for DES-related injuries.
One feature of the DES context that led the court toward a
participation-based theory of responsibility was the complexity of
modem market relations between manufacturers and consumers.
Reflecting the underlying paradigm of participation, the court men-
tioned this unusual complexity and, in addition, focused attention
88 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989). For further discussion of this case, see Sympo-
sium, The Problem of Indeterminate Defendant: Market Share Liability Theory, 55 BROOK. L. REV.
863 (1989).
89 Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1069. In this case, the New York Court of Appeals con-
solidated and affirmed four separate denials of defendant-manufacturers' motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs' motions to strike
affirmative defenses.
90 Id. at 1078.
91 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Martin v. Abbott
Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W. 2d 37 (Wis.
1984).
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on the victims' suffering. Seeking "to achieve the ends ofjustice in a
more modem context," 92 the court asserted that
it would be inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of a
modem society to say to these plaintiffs that because of the isidi-
ous [sic] nature of an injury that long remains dormant, and be-
cause so many manufacturers, each behind a curtain, contributed
to the devastation, the cost of injury should be borne by the inno-
cent and not the wrongdoers. 93
While Hymowitz is dearly an exception to traditional doctrinal princi-
ples,94 it provides a clear example of legal responsibility founded on
the paradigm of participation. As in the dram-shop and CERCLA
cases, the court assumed a causal link between a practice (manufac-
ture of DES) and the injury in question (illness due to ingestion of
the drug) without regard to the foreseeability or directness of the
link.
A fourth instance of legal responsibility in tort law that reflects
the paradigm of participation arises in arguments by advocates of
civil liability for pornography. The tension between the paradigms
of awareness and participation may illuminate as yet unsuccessful
attempts to expand liability beyond its traditional frontiers in a vari-
ety of areas, including liability for the sale of pornography. Tradi-
tional tort doctrine, characterized by proximate cause requirements,
provides precedent for restricting legal responsibility for harms re-
lated to sexual abuse to those who directly inflict them. In contrast,
the examples of dram-shop, CERCLA, and DES liability provide
clues as to how one might extend liability to those who participate in
the marketing of pornographic material depicting sexual abuse.
A threshold problem in imposing liability on those who market
pornography for harms caused by those who "consume" it has been
characterization of pornography as protected expression under the
First Amendment. 95 Beyond this obstacle, the difficulty of establish-
ing a causal connection between the sale of pornographic materials
and the sufferings of sexual abuse victims occupies a central place in
the debate over whether to subject pornographers to civil liability
for sexual violence. The question of whether pornography contrib-
92 Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1075 (referring to People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894
(1976) and Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973)).
93 Id. at 1075.
94 Id. at 1075 ("We stress, however, that the DES situation is a singular case....");
see also Aaron D. Twerski, Market Share-A Tale of Two Centuries, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 869
(1989).
95 American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (de-
claring the Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance in violation of the First Amend-
ment), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); see DONALD A. DowNs, THE NEW PoLrrics OF
PORNOGRAPHY 62 (1989) (discussing Mayor Donald Fraser's veto of Minneapolis anti-
pornography ordinance on First Amendment grounds).
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utes causally to violence remains hotly debated. 96 Some contend
that pornography exerts a cultural influence, helping to shape atti-
tudes and beliefs that lead to abuse. 97 Such an account of pornogra-
phy as a diffuse, systemic cause of sexual violence might support
pornographer liability under the paradigm of participation.
The question of pornographer liability may become clearer
when compared to other doctrines reflecting the paradigm of partic-
ipation. Like the case of pornography, the examples examined
above involve three elements charted in the following figure:
1 2 3
DRAM SHOP: sale of liquor intoxication injury
CERCLA: dumping of toxic waste storage of toxic waste injury
DES: sale of DES ingestion of DES injury
PORNOGRAPHY: sale of porn. consumption of porn. injury
Each example involves questions of cause and questions of cause
and proximate cause in holding defendants (associated with column
1) liable for harms to plaintiffs (associated with column 3). In tradi-
tional tort doctrine reflecting the paradigm of awareness, a plaintiff
would have to prove a connection of both cause and proximate
cause between the elements in columns 1 and 3.
In contrast, and in keeping with the paradigm of participation,
dram-shop liability, CERCLA, and Hymowitz require a showing of
cause and proximate cause only between the elements in columns 2
and 3.98 With regard to the connection between the elements in
columns 1 and 3, the courts assumed a causal link and considered irrele-
vant the question of proximate relation.99 In each of these exam-
96 GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE SOCIETY 75-
108 (1988) (reviewing government commission reports on the relation between pornog-
raphy and social harm). But see MARCIA PALLY, SENSE AND CENSORSHIP: THE VANrrY OF
BONFIRES 18-24 (1991).
97 American Booksellers Ass'n, 771 F.2d at 325; DowNs, supra note 95, at 34-43 (can-
vassing feminist theories on pornography).
98 Dram-shop liability requires plaintiffs to prove that the intoxication of a third
party is the cause and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. CERCLA requires that
toxic waste storage by a third party be a cause and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Hymowitz requires that pregnancy-related use of DES be a cause and proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury.
99 In dram-shop liability, the courts assume, consistent with statutory prohibition,
that the sale of liquor to an intoxicated patron causally contributes to injuries that result
proximately from intoxication. However, the courts considered irrelevant the issue of
whether such a sale is a proximate cause of plaintiff's resulting injury. In CERCLA
cases, courts assume that toxic waste dumping causally contributes to injuries that result
proximately from toxic waste dumping. However, they do not require any proof that
such dumping is a proximate cause of plaintiff's resulting injury. Similarly, in Hymowitz,
the court assumed that participation in the national marketing of DES for pregnancy-
related use of DES contributed causally to injuries that resulted proximately from preg-
nancy-related use of DES. But it did not require any proof that such market participa-
tion proximately caused plaintiffs' injury.
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ples, liability is grounded on two elements. The first is an
assumption that participation in a particular practice contributes
causally to specific harms. 00 These practices and harms are, respec-
tively: sale of liquor to intoxicated persons and injury caused by in-
toxication, toxic waste dumping and injury resulting from toxic
waste storage, and promotion of DES for pregnancy-related use and
injury due to DES ingestion during pregnancy. The second element
is proof that a specific action associated with the practice was the
factual and proximate cause of the specific harms.' 0 ' The specific
actions are, respectively: intoxication, toxic waste storage, and in-
gestion of DES during pregnancy. Pornographer liability could be
based on a parallel scheme.
Following the other examples of liability that reflect the para-
digm of participation, pornographer liability would require two ele-
ments: (1) an assumption that the production, promotion, or sale
of pornography contributes causally to sexual abuse and (2) proof
that a specific instance of defendant's consumption of pornography
is a factual and proximate cause of harm to an injured plaintiff.
Many opponents of such liability are unwilling to assume (1) and
skeptical of anyone's ability to satisfy (2). However courts already
assume causal relations between the practices of selling liquor to
intoxicated persons, dumping toxic waste, and promoting DES for
pregnancy use and specific harms not proximately connected to
them. If the burden of proof rests on dram-shop owners, toxic
waste dumpers, and DES manufacturers in these cases, why
shouldn't pornographers similarly bear it?
One might argue that whereas the first three of these potential
defendants are involved in wrongful practices, producing and dis-
tributing pornography is not in itself wrongful. But if these first
three practices are wrongful, it is only insofar as they cause others to
suffer. And in some cases, as advocates of pornographer liability
claim, so do pornographers. As for skepticism concerning the sec-
ond element, there exists both private and public testimony that
would merit a jury's consideration.10 2 Thus, acceptance of the para-
100 This first element represents the assumed causal link between the elements in
columns I and 3.
101 This second element represents the causal and proximate causal links between
the elements in columns 2 and 3.
102 For one example of such testimony, see Morning Edition, (National Public Radio,
Mar. 20, 1992) (written transcript on file with the author). Kathy Baldwin testified dur-
ing legislative hearings on the Massachusetts anti-pornography bill that:
He wanted me to watch how the various women in the video performed
oral sex on the men, and then he insisted that I do the same with him
while he continued to watch that movie. . . . That video became my
nightmare. Every time he made me turn it on, I became sick with fear, for
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digm of participation in the area of pornographer liability might
well affect the outcome of this debate.
IV
REFLECTIONS ON THE MEANING OF RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE FUNCTION OF TORT LAW
Why a society expresses, in political discourse and through
legal institutions, a preference for one paradigm of responsibility
over the other presents a difficult question outside of the realm of
my expertise but not beyond the bounds of my concern. The reflec-
tions set forth in this concluding part of the discussion are just
that-reflections-and not theories providing a developed concep-
tual framework or supported by documented empirical evidence. It
is with this disclaimer that I offer them. I begin with the question:
What accounts for the existence of two competing paradigms of
responsibility?
Many activities that one performs every day restrict the auton-
omy of others. This is largely a consequence of living highly inter-
dependent lives in a complex society. People who exert influence
over others in this way and individuals upon whom they exert influ-
ence perceive such interactions from distinct perspectives.10 3 Some
individuals experience the receiving end of this sort of imposition as
an exception to the normal course of events, while for others it is
the rule. These different perspectives give rise to disparate under-
standings of interpersonal relationships. The distinction between
the paradigms of awareness and participation characterizes this
disparity.
While different perspectives give rise to disparate understand-
ings of responsibility, one's social status does not necessarily deter-
mine which paradigm one accepts. The existence of two distinct
points of view makes available two different interpretations of the
injurer/victim relationship. However, some individuals may seek to
adopt the perspectives of others in their attempts to understand the
world around them. Thus, we witness the phenomenon popularly
known as "liberal guilt," in which one who occupies the position of
responsible injurer under the paradigm of participation neverthe-
less adopts that paradigm. So too, the propensity of some victims of
I knew that I was in for hours of verbal abuse, physical pain and sexual
torture.
Id
103 As Andrea Dworkin put it, "freedom looks different when you are the one it is
being practiced on." Andrea Dworkin, Pornography and the New Puritans: Letters from An-
drea Dworkin and Others, N.Y. TIMEs BOOK REV., May 3, 1992, at 15.
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injustice to blame only themselves arises from their adoption of the
injurer's perspective and the accompanying paradigm of awareness.
Perhaps the reasons why our society favors the paradigm of
awareness, and I believe that it does, lie in its historical develop-
ment. In less complex liberal societies, people may most often rec-
ognize injury as a foreseeable and direct bilateral affair between
individuals. The close physical and temporal proximity between in-
jurers and victims in those preindustrial societies, from which our
social and legal conventions derive, may have led them to adopt the
paradigm of awareness. As these societies became more complex,
some interactions, injurious ones included, may have been mediated
through other people, whose combined and interdependent activi-
ties constituted social structures in which causal connections be-
came indirect and often unforeseeable. This account might explain
the relatively recent appearance in tort law of legal responsibility
without proximate cause. However, it fails to explain why, in our
own highly complex society, the paradigm of awareness has re-
mained the dominant conception of responsibility in both political
discourse and law.
Perhaps instead, the reason why our society favors the para-
digm of awareness lies in the nature of power. Those with power to
act in ways that impose on others may, over time, experience fewer
and fewer limitations on their autonomy. This sense of freedom
may lead them to seek even less restriction on their autonomy, in-
ducing them to adopt the paradigm of awareness in matters of re-
sponsibility. This might explain why those who argue for
responsibility based on participation are usually members of
marginalized groups or their advocates. It might also account for
why an imperial society, which exerts so much economic, political,
and military power over other countries, might favor the paradigm
of awareness. However, this explanation fails to account for feelings
of powerlessness expressed by some "beneficiaries" of domination
who feel trapped, individuals unable to respond meaningfully to suf-
fering to which they may admit causal contribution but for which
they do not feel responsibility. Indeed, the very feeling of having no
meaningful response available, rather than a sense of power, may
lead such people to embrace the paradigm of awareness.
The rival paradigm of participation challenges deeply rooted
notions of autonomy and innocence. Confronting its implications
can be emotionally very difficult. In our society, which favors the
paradigm of awareness, responsibility for the suffering of others is
restricted; it is an exception to the normal course of events, not the
rule. Responsibility for harm to others is also a very serious matter,
carrying heavy moral and practical consequences. The radical ex-
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pansion of responsibility implied by the paradigm of participation
threatens to crush us under the weight of moral condemnation and
monetary sanctions that follow from responsibility for others' suffer-
ing in our society.
However, this frightening expansiveness of the paradigm of
participation is its greatest asset. For this aspect of the paradigm
highlights our connection with those who suffer. Social, political,
and economic ills become difficulties in our relations with other indi-
viduals, rather than simply their problems.10 4 The suffering of
others, under the paradigm of participation, demands a response
from us, rather than leaving us with the option of simply distancing
ourselves from it. But even assuming that most people in our soci-
ety were willing to accept this paradigm on a personal level, how
could we structure legal institutions to reflect it? In the case of the
tort system, the burden of damages would be crippling, as it has
been to many defendants in pharmaceutical and environmental
litigation.
While it is true that a primary function of the tort system is to
attach sanctions to responsibility in the form of damages, this is not
its only function. Tort law also plays an epistemic role in our soci-
ety, revealing injustice by illuminating relationships in the light of
our public standards of responsibility. Tort law not only remedies
injustice by imposing damage awards, it also exposes normative fea-
tures of relations between parties by articulating and applying con-
ceptions of responsibility. In a world of tort law based more on the
paradigm of participation, findings of responsibility might well in-
crease, while sanctions for it might decline. Such a system might
better expose the importance of sometimes simply recognizing re-
sponsibility for human suffering as a way of motivating response to
it rather than always restricting responsibility to cases in which state
coercion can remedy it.
In the end, we must seek to strike a balance between the two
paradigms. For on one hand, the cost of fairness under the restric-
tive paradigm of awareness is disrespect for the autonomy of vic-
tims. And on the other hand, pursuit ofjustice under the expansive
paradigm of participation may exhaust the ability, and perhaps the
desire as well, of injurers to respond practically to the suffering of
others.10 5 Such a balance, it seems, represents an equal valuation of
104 Martha Minow analyzes problems of exclusion as difficulties in relations rather
than difference in MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLU-
SION, AND AMERICAN LAw 79-97, 111 (1990).
105 Finding a balance between the paradigms of awareness and participation would
require a principle that limits liability somewhere beyond the narrow bounds of aware-
ness, yet short of the seemingly endless horizons of participation. Perhaps some con-
ception of wrongdoing might provide this principle. Courts in the dram-shop, CERCLA
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the autonomy of injurers to act in ways that harm others unknow-
ingly and the autonomy of victims to equal security and respect. But
how could these two forms of autonomy be of equal value? Such an
understanding of "balance" seems blatantly to favor the autonomy
of injurers, even if only in a restrained way.
This balance between the paradigms of awareness and partici-
pation is not an ideal ofjustice. Quite to the contrary, it represents
a compromise ofjustice no matter how one looks at it. For the para-
digm of awareness yields an ideal of justice that is unfair from the
perspective of victims, and the paradigm of participation produces
one that would overwhelm all but the most oppressed.'0 6 The limits
of pursuing perfect justice under the paradigm of awareness will
leave many unsatisfied, while the vigilance of doing so under the
paradigm of participation may simply exhaust most.
In such a world, perhaps the best that law can do is to articulate
and safeguard this unhappy balance, an imperfect ideal of unstable
equilibrium. The job ofjudges would not be to promote justice but
rather to compromise it in the face of practical demands of individ-
ual freedom.' 0 7 Shalom Spiegel saw justice itself as precisely this
sort of compromise when he wrote that "Uj]ustice cools the fierce
glow of moral passion by making it pass through reflection."' 0 8
Remarking on the tension between the freedom to act, which
often entails imposing on others, and justice in relations between
individuals, which demands reciprocal respect, Camus observed
that:
Absolute freedom is the right of the strongest to dominate....
Absolute justice is achieved by the suppression of all contradic-
tion: .. .it destroys freedom .... Absolute freedom mocks at
and DES contexts have found a convenient limit insofar as the responsibility of only a
few parties was in question-those parties joined as defendants. One might seek to ac-
count for this procedural limit substantively, using a conception of wrongfulness. I am
currently reflecting on the role of wrongfulness in providing a limiting principle of re-
sponsibility that might serve to balance the paradigms of awareness and participation.
106 George Eliot wrote of our need to ignore much of the world around us:
If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be
like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should
die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. As it is, the quick-
est of us walk around wadded with stupidity.
GEORGE EUOT, MIDDLEMARCH 144 (Gordon H. Haight ed., 1968).
107 I am grateful to Peter Berkowitz for turning my attention to this implication of
the paradigm of participation.
108 ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTIsLAVERY AND THEJUDICIAL PROCESS iv
(1975) (citing SHALoM SPIEGEL, AMOS V. AMAZLAH (1957) in dedication). Robert Cover
also envisioned the task of legal judgement as a conflict between two often irreconcilable
ideals: loyalty to legal order and commitment to moral righteousness. See id. at 197-260
(discussing the "moral-formal dilemma").
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justice. Absolute justice denies freedom. To be fruitful, the two
ideas must find their limits in each other. 10 9
Determining fair and practical limits to our conception of responsi-
bility for human suffering is central both to how we understand the
world and how we conduct ourselves in it. Such an important task
demands that we maintain a balance between the perspectives of
those who participate unwittingly in injustice and those who suffer
it. For, as Camus wrote, "man is not entirely to blame; it was not he
who started history; nor is he entirely innocent, since he continues
it."1 10 We must respond to the suffering of those around us, for we
are likely responsible in some measure. But we must be mindful of
the limits of our attempts to establish any ideal ofjustice, for we are
merely human by any measure.
109 CAMus, supra note 1, at 287-88, 291.
110 Id. at 297.
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